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Abstract
This study estimates the effect of participating in extension programs on agricultural productivity 
in India. Using data from India’s National Sample Survey 59th Round, farm-level productivity is 
estimated by a stochastic frontier analysis, and the effect of participation is estimated econometrically 
by the control function approach. Technical efficiency as measured by total factor productivity was 
approximately fi ve times higher among farmers participating in private extension programs than among 
farmers participating in government programs. Among other extension programs, Krishi Vigyan Kendra 
programs demonstrate greater contributions to productivity than programs by primary cooperative 
societies and credit agencies.
Keywords? agricultural extension, household agricultural productivity, treatment effects model
JEL Classifi cation Numbers?I38, O13, Q16
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1. Introduction
World agriculture, particularly Asian agriculture, experienced a giant technological change during the Green 
Revolution of 1965–1985. Increased crop yields and enhanced employment brought a rapid decline in pov-
erty during the 20th century, but these effects have slowed, renewing the imperative to increase productivity. 
Agricultural extension programs increase farm productivity by exchanging information and improving mar-
ket access, and extension systems have long been grounded in a diffusion model—the research-extension-
farmer linkage in which technologies and information are transferred from research systems to farmers and 
vice versa (Swanson et al., 1998). In general, government extension programs have emphasized increasing 
production, and extension is a policy tool for promoting the safety and quality of agricultural products.  Thus, 
by promoting agricultural innovation and information, extension services can improve the livelihoods of the 
poor.
Approximately 1.4 billion of the world’s people are poor. India contains one-third of them, approximately 
455.8 million persons as measured by a poverty threshold of $1.25 per day (Table 1) (Chen and Ravallion, 
2008). Three-quarters of the world’s poor live in rural areas and rely mainly on agriculture for their liveli-
hoods (IFAD, 2001). More than 70% of India’s rural population subsists on farming (Hegde, 2000) and about 
58.4% of India’s labour force is employed in the agricultural sector (Haque, 2003). Thus, welfare of the 
world’s rural populations, of the rural poor and of the poor in general depends on advancements in agricul-
ture, and Indian agriculture is at the centre stage in the global challenge of alleviating poverty.
However, food production faces the ever-increasing and increasingly severe challenges of low productivity 
and diminishing reserves of potentially cultivable land. Farmers respond to these circumstances by seeking 
interaction with extension services. Agricultural extension programs are the Indian government’s primary 
means for assisting farmers by providing information and technology to expand their abilities and improve 
production (Sharma, 2003). The signifi cant questions are whether India’s programs improve productivity and, 
if so, to what extent. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Region Living <$1.00 Living <$1.25 Living <$2.00 Living <$2.50
East Asia and Pacifi c 179.8 336.9 748.3 987.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 16.0 23.9 50.1 69.5
Latin America and Caribbean 27.6 45.1 98.7 132.9
Middle East and North Africa 6.2 14.0 58.0 94.3
South Asia 350.3 595.5 1091.6 1246.4
?Of which India 266.5 455.8 827.7 938.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 299.1 384.2 551.0 609.9
Total 879.0 1399.6 2597.8 3140.2
Source: Chen and Ravallion, 2008
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This study addresses the question of to what extent government, private and other extension services infl u-
ence agricultural productivity for the individual farm. The study’s objectives are as follows: 1) to estimate the 
productivity of farm-level agricultural production and 2) to assess the benefi ts of participating in government, 
private and other extension programs on household agricultural productivity. Understanding the importance 
of productivity and exploring ways to increase it are essential in identifying effective agricultural policies. By 
measuring the effectiveness of extension programs, this study will assist in shaping policies that increase agri-
cultural productivity. 
2. Empirical methodologies
This study employs a two-step procedure to estimate the effectiveness of extension programs on productivity. 
In the fi rst step, a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is estimated to identify productivity in terms of technical 
effi ciency of each farm household. In the second step, a treatment effects model is applied by using a control 
function approach to examine how participation in extension programs affects farm-level productivity.
2.1 Productivity estimation
We select total factor productivity (TFP) per farm household as the measure of performance because in-
creases in TFP unambiguously raise farm income when other production inputs and product prices are held 
constant (Otsuki, 2010). We use a stochastic frontier model to measure TFP because it allows for partitioning 
the stochastic error term into two components: systematic random error to account for statistical noise and an 
ineffi ciency component (Battese and Coelli, 1992). In addition, it provides the basis for conducting statistical 
tests of hypothesis regarding production structure and degrees of ineffi ciency. Moreover, in cross-sectional 
frameworks involving a single time period, technical effi ciency is customarily interpreted as TFP. 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) pioneered the development of stochastic frontier 
production functions. The model estimates technical efficiency/inefficiency of individual farmers, and the 
technical effi ciency/ineffi ciency measure is equally valid for single outputs or for multiple outputs that need 
to be aggregated into a single-output index. We have aggregated multiple outputs in this analysis. The entire 
shortfall of observed output  from maximum feasible output is attributed to technical ineffi ciency 
in stochastic frontier model.  The model is given as
 (1)
where  is the stochastic production frontier, and the technical effi ciency is given as
 (2)
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Here,  achieves its maximum value of  if and only if  Otherwise,  provides 
a measure of the shortfall between the observed output and the maximum feasible output in an environment 
characterized by stochastic elements that vary across producers. The general form of production function for 
the ith production unit of this model is given as 
 (3)
where  is assumed to be an identically symmetric and independently distributed error that represents ran-
dom variations in output that are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance  Fol-
lowing Battese and Coelli (1995), the  is assumed non-negative random variables that represent technical 
ineffi ciency, i.e. the stochastic shortfall of output from the most effi cient production. Stochastic disturbance 
term  is assumed to be distributed independently of  Thus, error term  is not symmetric be-
cause  Assuming that  and  are distributed independently of , estimation of (3) by OLS will 
provide consistent estimates of all parameters except the intercept term because  Moreover, 
OLS cannot isolate technical effi ciency from the residual term. A different estimation technique with addition-
al assumptions is required for a consistent estimate of the intercept and technical effi ciency of each producer. 
The maximum likelihood estimation is appropriate under the assumption that  is normally distributed, 
while  is the positive half-normal distribution which assures that technical effi ciency estimates fall between 
0 and 1. The half-normal distribution works best and is most often used because the standard deviation of the 
normal (truncated at zero) is able to concentrate effi ciencies near zero or spread them out (Greene, 1990). 
Other empirical studies using different distributional assumptions for comparison showed that both rankings 
and effi ciency scores are generally similar across distributions (Fujii, 2001; Street, 2003). In this study, we 
considered the half-normal distributional assumption of the ineffi ciency component. 
2.2 Estimation of participation effect
The examination of the effect of participation in extension programs on productivity is diffi cult due to the 
lack of a counterfactual and participation is self-selective. Unobserved factors such as farmers’ motivation, 
management and production skills can increase the likelihood of participation and productivity, worsening 
the counterfactual problem. Another problem in the estimation of treatment effects—selection bias—arises 
because treated and non-treated individuals can differ for reasons other than the treatment status per se. The 
consequence is a failure to meet the randomization assumption, and the counterfactual may provide inconsis-
tent estimates of causal effects by simple comparisons or regression-adjusted comparisons, even after adjust-
ing for observed differences (Otsuki, 2010).
In practice, models of treatment effects permit the comparison of real outcomes with the counterfactual 
case, thus overcoming the self-selection problem (Otsuki, 2010). They have been used widely in program 
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evaluation literature but seldom for studying extension programs. A standard treatment effects model is given 
as
 (4)
where  is the outcome variable,  is the binary treatment assignment (  if participation oc-
curs, otherwise ),  a coeffi cient estimator for  that is interpreted as a treatment effect,  is a vector 
of exogenous variables,  a vector of coeffi cient parameters for  and  is an error term that follows 
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance . The participation of individuals based on a set of determi-
nants  is specifi ed as
 (5)
where  is a latent variable,  is a vector of coeffi cient parameters and  is an error term. The latent 
variable is unobservable and its relationship with  is specifi ed by 
. (6)
If unobserved factors in (5) are correlated with , the correlation coeffi cient between  and  (denoted 
by ) is non-zero, and thus, the OLS estimate is inconsistent (Greene, 2008). Then, the expected outcome as-
suming normal distribution for  becomes
where the expected outcome for the participants is
 (8)
and the expected outcome for the non-participants is
 (9)
Here, equals the covariance between  and  for participants, equals the covariance between 
 and for non-participants, is the marginal probability of standard normal distribution at  and 
 is the cumulative probability of standard normal distribution at . The third term of (8) and second 
term of (9) include the inverse Mill’s ratio to control for possible sample selection bias. The difference in ex-
pected outcome between participants and non-participants then becomes 
 (10)
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The positive (negative) sign of the selection term implies that OLS overestimates (underestimates)  and the 
sign of the selection term depends on that of . The maximum likelihood estimation is utilized because it 
produces consistent estimators (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2008). It also jointly estimates the participation and 
productivity equations and allows the testing of the signifi cance of cross-equation correlation . 
2.3 Empirical model
2.3.1 Stochastic frontier model
The agricultural production function is
 (11)
where ln(Output) is the natural log of total receipts obtained from output and byproducts, lnLand is the natu-
ral log of the total number of hectares under cultivation, lnLabor is the natural log of wage expenditures for 
both regular and casual agricultural labour, lnNonLabor is the natural log of expenditures for non-labour in-
puts (seed, fertilizer, pesticides, water) and i is the individual farm. 
The technical effi ciency of production for the ith farm can be computed as 
 (12)
where  Yi is its observed output and 
* Yi  is its maximum possible output given the available inputs. 
2.3.2 Treatment effects model
The outcome equation is
 (13)
and the equation for participation in government extension programs is
 (14)
The participation equations for private and other extension programs differ from that for government pro-
grams. Variables for all participation equations are selected from actual criteria for participating in specifi c 
extension programs. The variables included in (13), (14) and for participation in other types of extension 
programs are as follows: TE is technical effi ciency obtained from SFA, Ext is a binary variable for actual 
participation in an extension program (1 if a participant and 0 if not), Age is the age of the respondent, Age2 is 
the square of respondents’ ages, Edu is the respondent’s educational level, Sex is the respondent’s gender (1 
if male and 0 if female), Hsize is number of persons in each farm household, Hland is homestead land size, 
Regis is a binary variable for a registered group membership (1 for membership and 0 for non-membership), 
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AgTrain is a binary variable for receipt of agricultural training (1 if training received and 0 if not), Offi ncome 
is the off-farm income and i is the individual farm household. 
3. Study area and data
This study uses data from the National Sample Survey 59th Round (NSS-R59) conducted by the National 
Sample Survey Organization of India in 2003. The survey covered the entire Indian Union except for some 
inaccessible areas. The survey adopted a stratifi ed multi-stage design in which fi rst-stage units were villages 
covered by the census and the ultimate stage units were households. First-stage units comprising a total of 
10,736 rural villages were allocated to Indian states in proportion to their provisional population in the 2001 
census. The ultimate stage units consisted of 51,700 households drawn from the fi rst stage. 
The situation assessment survey was designed to collect information about farming and socio-economic 
characteristics of farm households following fi ve decades of planned economic development. The survey de-
fi ned a farmer as the one who owned, leased or otherwise possessed land and was engaged in agriculture. This 
study considers a sample of 16,644 self-employed farmers whose principal source of income was cultivation. 
4. Empirical results
4.1 Productivity estimation
The results of SFA for both unconstrained and constant returns to scale (CRS) models are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method (Table 2). All variables and the intercept are statistically signifi cant at 1% with 
the expected signs in both models. The largest elasticity is observed for land in both models, indicating that 
land is indispensible to agricultural output and independent of other factors that, ceteris paribus, aid produc-
tivity. The non-labour input variable has the second-largest elasticity in both models, confi rming the impor-
tance of other customary agricultural inputs. Labour also has considerable elasticity, indicating its importance.
??? ???????? ???????
Variable
Unconstrained model CRS model
Coeffi cient Std. error Coeffi cient Std. error
Constant 3.7412 *** 0.0450 2.9037 *** 0.0136
lnLand 0.3497 *** 0.0080 0.4400 *** 0.0066
lnLabor 0.2313 *** 0.0063 0.2575 *** 0.0063
lnNonLabor 0.2997 *** 0.0069 0.3025 *** 0.0070
0.9272 0.0135 0.9170 0.0139
0.5682 0.0068 0.5853 0.0069
1.1825 0.0210 1.1834 0.0212
1.6319 0.0187 1.5668 0.0191
0.7270 0.7106
Wald 23744.84 *** 7281.93 ***
No. of observation 16,664 16,664
LR statistics 8.1e+02 ***
Source: Author’s estimation based on NSS-R59 (2003) data for India
Note: The symbol *** indicates 1% signifi cance level. Stata version 11’s command ‘frontier’ is used for the estimation.
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Results presented in Table 2 indicate that parameter is 1.6319 for the unconstrained model and 1.5668 for 
the CRS model, which estimates the ratio of the standard deviation of the ineffi ciency component to the stan-
dard deviation of the idiosyncratic component. The likelihood ratio (LR) of the unconstrained model is signif-
icant at 1%, indicating the effects of technical ineffi ciency. Technical effi ciency is calculated for each sample 
once ineffi ciency term  is adjusted so that technical effi ciency scores do not exceed the range . Pa-
rameter  measures the variability of the two sources of error (white noise disturbance and unilateral error). 
It reached 0.7270 (72.70%) for the unconstrained model and 0.7106 (71.06%) for the constrained model. The 
total composed error variance of the production function is explained by the variance of the technical ineffi -
ciency term. These terms represent the importance of incorporating technical ineffi ciency in production func-
tions.
Descriptive statistics for the technical effi ciency measure of both models indicate that the mean is slightly 
higher than half of the highest (Table 3). These statistics imply substantial potential to improve effi ciency 
among sampled farmers and hence improve production output and/or reduce production costs. 
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Model Mean Std. deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Unconstraint 0.5500 0.1548 0.5679 0.0109 0.9343
CRS 0.5528 0.1510 0.5696 0.0101 0.9298
Source: Author’s estimation based on NSS-R59 (2003) data for India
4.2 The effect of participation in extension programs
Our econometric model that examines the productivity improvement from participating in extension programs 
is denoted in the productivity equation. The model is specifi ed by setting a productivity index as  exog-
enous factors to infl uence  as  and a dummy for participation in extension programs as  in (4). The 
participation equation is specifi ed by setting the exogenous determinants of program participation as in (5). 
We use the participation equation to derive controls, but we believe there are many other possible equations 
which also contain information on unobserved determinants of participation. We applied the control function 
approach to address this problem. The approach uses observed variables and the economic theory to drive 
controls for the part of the unobserved determinants that is not independent of the participation in extension 
programs. For the participation equation, we consider alternative extension programs—government, private, 
Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK), primary cooperative societies and credit agencies.
Technical effi ciency from the unconstrained model is the productivity measure for estimating effective-
ness. We consider the unconstrained model for this purpose for its fl exibility, whereas the CRS assumption is 
sometimes too restrictive and unrealistic. The next sub-section compares results and discusses consequences 
of participating in government and private extension programs. A later sub-section discusses results of partici-
pating in other extension programs, which cannot be clearly distinguished as government or private programs.
4.2.1 Government and private extension
Table 4 presents results of the productivity and participation equations for government and private extension 
programs. It shows the coeffi cient estimate and the standard error of each variable and inverse Mill’s ratio . 
Table 4 also shows the estimate of coeffi cient parameter  for the productivity and participation equations as 
well as the chi-squared statistics for the Wald test of model predictability. The p-values for the Wald test sug-
gest that the joint signifi cance of the coeffi cient parameters attains 1% confi dence for both government and 
private extension organization models. 
Results of the participation equation indicate that registered group membership, training and education are 
personal characteristics that determine participation in government extension programs. Registered group 
membership and off-farm income are important characteristics determining participation in private extension 
programs. Signifi cant coeffi cient parameters are largely different across the treatment types, but as Rogers 
(2003) indicated, farmers’ participation in extension programs is infl uenced by their degree of innovation. 
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Membership in a social group provides opportunities to discuss and observe practices of other members at no 
cost or time intensity, whereas education and income infl uence actual participation, confi rming previous stud-
ies (e.g. Egziabher et al., 2011). 
Results of the productivity estimation indicate that participation in government or private extension pro-
grams increases productivity. The difference in productivity between participants and non-participants is 
given by the coeffi cient estimate for the participation dummy: it is greater for participants in private extension 
programs, indicating their superior effectiveness. Controlling for other factors, our results indicate that mar-
ginal productivity improvement for participants is 15.12% for respondents who participated in private exten-
sion programs and 2.96% for those who participated in government programs compared to their respective 
non-participants. Thus the productivity of private extension program participants is about fi ve times higher 
compared to productivity of government extension program participants. Similar fi ndings are reported by Di-
nar et al. (2007). This result may be explained by private extension programs being more up to date and better 
oriented towards farmers’ needs than government extension programs. In addition, results of the participation 
equation earlier suggested that farmers who are members of registered groups are more likely to participate 
in private extension. This characteristic may also have an impact on the higher productivity observed among 
??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Variable Government extension Private extension
Coeffi cient Std. error Coeffi cient Std. error
Constant 0.4505 *** 0.0243 0.5057 *** 0.0994
Extension service 0.0296 * 0.0161 0.1512 * 0.0798
Age 0.0016 *** 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0033
Age2 -0.00001 *** 5.63e-06 0.00002 0.00004
Education 0.0010 *** 0.0002 0.0030 *** 0.0009
Sex 0.0113 ** 0.0054 0.0261 0.0288
Household size 0.0035 *** 0.0004 0.0023 0.0023
Homestead land 0.0128 0.0182 -0.0200 0.0574
-0.0231 0.0078 -0.0652 0.0286
Contact equation
Constant 0.8143 *** 0.2852 -8.0704 3417.13
Regis. group member -0.6713 *** 0.0699 3.9678 *** 1512.63
Training -0.4993 *** 0.0712
Off-farm income 0.4018 *** 0.1438
Education 0.0132 *** 0.0022 -0.0164 0.0190
Homestead land -0.0213 0.2154 -4.0966 1588.88
 (P value) -0.1468 (0.01) ** 0.0468 -0.4053 (0.09) * 0.1738
Model  (P value) 133.44 (0) *** 21.06 (0) ***
N 14,291 14,291
Source: Author’s estimation based on NSS-R59 (2003) data for India
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% signifi cance levels, respectively. Stata version 11’s ‘treatreg’ command is used for the 
estimation.
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participants in private groups, because a group approach is the salient feature of private extension programs 
in India, whereas individual farmers are focused on by government programs. Private extension programs 
also hold their fi eld staffs to stricter levels of responsibility and accountability. Therefore the scopes of the 
private extension programs need to explore with relaxed operational rules whereas the government extension 
programs should be made more effi cient for productivity improvement. 
The independence of the productivity and the participation equations is rejected by the chi-squared test at 
5% and 10% levels of confi dence for government and private extension programs, respectively. This implies 
sample selection bias in program participation. The negative selection bias implies a negative correlation 
between unobserved determinants of participation and productivity. This may arise from unobserved adverse 
factors that discourage farmers’ participation in extension programs, such as lack of motivation (Rogers, 
2003). These negative factors may have dominated positive factors such as farming skill.
4.2.2 Other extension programs
Table 5 shows results of the productivity and the participation equations for KVK, primary cooperative so-
cieties and credit agencies. Wald tests suggest that the joint signifi cance of the coeffi cient parameters attains 
1% confi dence in all three models. Results of the participation equation indicate that off-farm income is an 
important determinant of participation in all three types of extension programs. Generally, income is an indi-
cator of social status in rural India; hence, extension organizations seek higher-income farmers as participants 
to establish rapport with the community. 
Results of the productivity estimation indicate that participation in all three types of extension programs in-
creases productivity, but the coeffi cient estimate for the participation dummy is greatest for KVK, indicating 
its singular effectiveness. The coeffi cient estimate is also the greatest compared to government and private 
extension programs (Table 4). Controlling for other factors, our results indicate that marginal productivity im-
provement for participants is 20.49% for respondents who participated in KVK programs, 16.36% for those 
who participated in primary cooperative society programs and 12.33% for those who participated in credit 
agency programs compared to their respective non-participants. KVKs are operated by educational, research 
and training institutes investigating specifi c farm problems and/or recent technologies. They arrange training 
to address urgent problems, provide applied solutions and transfer recent technologies that may help partici-
pants increase their productivity. Members of primary cooperative societies share their knowledge and prob-
lems and are easily approached as a group; thus they may receive more extension services than non-members, 
increasing their productivity (Githaiga, 2007; Evenson and Mwabu, 1998). According to Rogers (2003), 
members of societies or groups may be more receptive to innovation than non-members. These groups’ inno-
vativeness may improve the productivity of their members. Credit agencies also aid productivity signifi cantly 
and are regarded as important contributors to Indian agriculture. 
??? ???????? ???????
The chi-squared test rejects the independence of the productivity and the participation equations at the 5% 
confi dence level for KVK and at 1% for primary cooperative societies. The independence hypothesis was not 
rejected for the credit agency model, although this does not detract from its signifi cance as an agricultural 
program. Thus, sample selection bias is implied for participation in extension programs other than those by 
credit agencies. The negative selection bias implies a negative correlation  between the unobserved deter-
minants of participation and productivity. 
Our overall results suggest that participation in all extension programs maintains or improves agricultural 
productivity through technology transfer. KVK, primary cooperative societies, credit agencies and private 
extension programs are more prominent in this regard. These programs can be improved by easing terms 
and conditions for farmers’ participation as well as relaxing the rules and regulations for their operation. To 
achieve full potential, the government extension service needs to strengthen exploration and better supervise 
the performance of fi eld personnel. Although sequential improvement in productivity is not investigated in 
our analysis, participating in extension programs probably maintains higher long-term productivity because 
transferred technology improves farmers’ skills. 
5. Conclusion
By employing national survey data in a treatment effects model, this study has investigated whether partici-
pating in extension programs improves farm-level agricultural productivity in India. The treatment effects 
model is estimated by using control function approach for controlling the unobservable determinants of par-
ticipation. We found that participation in all types of extension programs signifi cantly increases agricultural 
productivity and India’s farms operate at slightly more than half of their full potential, suggesting prospects 
for further productivity improvements. The marginal productivity of survey respondents who participated in 
private extension programs was fi ve times higher than that of participants in government extension programs 
considering their respective non-participants. Among other extension programs, participants in KVKs showed 
greater improvement than participants in programs sponsored by credit agencies and primary cooperative 
societies. Extension programs enhance productivity mainly through technology transfer, and expanding their 
range of services to include solving farming problems could increase their value to Indian farmers. Services 
by extension programs are expected to have signifi cant economic infl uence on Indian agriculture. This in-
fl uence could spread if extension services are more successful at motivating farmers to participate. Future 
research needs to investigate methods and incentives to induce marginalized farmers to join and remain mem-
bers of private sector extension programs, credit agencies, primary cooperative societies and KVKs.
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